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Quantum generalizations of conventional games broaden the range of available strategies, which
can help improve outcomes for the participants. With many players, such quantum games can
involve entanglement among many states which is difficult to implement, especially if the states
must be communicated over some distance. This paper describes a quantum mechanism for the
economically significant n-player public goods game that requires only two-particle entanglement
and is thus much easier to implement than more general quantum mechanisms. In spite of the large
temptation to free ride on the efforts of others in this game, two-particle entanglement is sufficient
to give near optimal expected payoff when players use a simple mixed strategy for which no player
can benefit by making different choices. This mechanism can also address some heterogeneous
preferences among the players.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 02.50.Le, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information processing provides a variety of
new capabilities with potentially significant performance
improvements over conventional techniques. One exam-
ple is quantum computation with its ability to rapidly
solve problems, such as factoring [1], which appear to
be otherwise intractable. However, implementing ma-
chines with enough bits and coherence time to solve prob-
lems difficult enough to be of practical interest is a ma-
jor challenge. Another application, quantum cryptogra-
phy, is feasible today for exchanging keys over distances
of tens of kilometers. A third area, which potentially
can come into practical use soon, is quantum economic
mechanisms and games. Extending classical games into
the quantum realm broadens the range of strategies [2],
and has been examined in the context of the Prisoner’s
dilemma [3, 4, 5, 6] and the n-player minority game [7].
Quantum games do not require long sequences of coher-
ent operations and hence are likely to be easier to realize
than large-scale quantum computations.
In this paper, we present a quantum version of an im-
portant social dilemma: public goods. Provisioning for
public goods is a well-studied social choice problem. A
typical example is a group deciding whether to provide a
common good, such as a park, in the face of potential free
riders. The free rider problem [8] cannot be solved with
traditional means without either a third party to enforce
agreements or a repeated game scenario in which partici-
pants can self-police. Government is one typical solution.
While government is a good solution to public goods in-
volving a large population such as national defense, it is
inefficient to provide public goods in smaller groups such
as neighborhood watch. Provision of these smaller scale
public goods often relies on altruism and other weaker in-
centives. Invariably, contributions to these public goods
are not at efficient levels.
Quantum mechanics offers the ability to solve the free-
rider problem in the absence of a third party enforcer
in a single shot game without repetition. With suitable
design, simple mixed strategies almost entirely avoid the
free rider problem and give expected performance close
to the Pareto efficient value when the size of the group
is large. In our case, the power of the quantum mecha-
nism comes from entanglement. Quantum entanglement
allows individuals to pre-commit to agreements where
otherwise it would be individually rational to renege.
Three different quantum mechanisms with different de-
grees of entanglement are reported in this paper. These
differ in their performance characteristics and ease of
implementation. The results provide information about
how one can best design a quantum mechanism to solve
the free-rider problem.
Equal to the importance of its economics properties
is whether a quantum mechanism can be built. This is-
sue is addressed by restricting our attention to quantum
systems that can be practically implemented by technolo-
gies that could soon be available. Creating and commu-
nicating highly-entangled states among n players poses
significant implementation challenges. The most read-
ily implementable mechanisms are those that only re-
quire entanglement among pairs of states. Thus an in-
teresting practical question for developing applications of
quantum information processing is whether performance
of the public goods game can be significantly improved
with quantum mechanisms limited to using two-particle
entangled states. We have developed a mechanism only
requiring communication of two-particle entangled states
among the players. This mechanism could be feasible to
implement in the near future even for players at different
locations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the general approach to “quantize” a classical game. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the economics of the public goods game.
Section 4 describes the quantum version of the public
goods game and its solutions. Section 5 concludes with
possible extensions to our mechanism.
2II. QUANTUM GAMES
This section describes one approach to generalize con-
ventional games to make use of entangled quantum
states. We then discuss issues involved in their imple-
mentation, particularly the significant benefit for games
restricted to use only two-particle entanglement.
A. Creating Quantum Games
A game consists of a set S of choices available to the
players and an associated payoff to each player based on
those choices. With sk ∈ S denoting the choice made by
player k and s = (s1, . . . , sn). A game is defined by the
payoffs to the players depending on these choices, i.e.,
Pk(s).
One approach [4, 7] for generalizing these games to
quantum operators considers superpositions of all possi-
ble choices
∑
s ψs|s〉 summing over all choices in S for
each player. The quantum version of the game starts
by creating an initial superposition. Subsequently each
player is allowed to operate only on their corresponding
part of the state. In the last stage, the final superposi-
tion is used to produce a definite choice for each player
via a further joint operation followed by a measurement.
The initial and final operations, acting on the full super-
position, are fixed and known to the players.
To give a direct generalization of the original game,
the player’s operations should include choices that cor-
respond to the original choices. That is, the initial and
final operations on the state should reproduce the payoff
structure for the original game if all players restrict their
individual operations to just those corresponding to the
actions allowed in the original game.
More precisely, the game proceeds as follows:
• Starting with a particular initial superposition v,
create the entangled state Jv, where J is an entan-
glement operator that commutes with the classical
single-player operators.
• Players select an operation to apply to their part
of the superposition, giving v′ = (U1⊗ . . .⊗Un)Jv
where Uk is operator used by player k.
• Finally undo the initial entanglement, giving ψ =
J†v′. For a given game, i.e., choices for v and J ,
the final superposition is a function of the players’
choices, i.e., ψ(U1, . . . , Un).
• Measure the state, giving a specific value for each
player’s choice. The probability to produce choices
s (i.e., a particular assignment, 0 or 1, to each bit)
is |ψs|2.
The choice of J determines the type and amount of
entanglement among the players. The commutation con-
dition on J ensures that if each player selects the operator
corresponding to one of the choices in the original game,
the final result of the quantum game will, with probabil-
ity 1, reproduce those choices.
B. Implementing Entanglement for Many Players
Ideally, we would like our scheme to rely on the distri-
bution of entangled states between distant players, im-
plying that the qubits are encoded in the polarization
states of photons transmitted throughout a fiber-optic
network. Given a bright source of polarization-entangled
photon pairs [9], these qubits can be delivered by prop-
agation through optical fibers, and purified using high-
quality linear optical elements [10]. In principle, maxi-
mally entangled n-photon states can be constructed from
entangled two-photon states [11, 12], and these states can
be further manipulated using linear optical elements to
perform universal gate operations [13].
However, scaling a fully entangled game from 2 to n
players can be nontrivial even when linear optics is used.
Suppose a trial between any two players succeeds with
probability β (incorporating the net efficiency with which
entanglement can be created, distributed, purified, ma-
nipulated, and detected), so the mean number of trials
needed to successfully register a mutual choice between
two players is 1/β. Because an accidental (or deliber-
ately disruptive) measurement of a single qubit in the
n-particle maximally entangled state destroys the entire
state, we expect the number of trials needed to com-
plete a maximally-entangled game for n players will scale
no better than β−n. Suppose instead we implement the
game by distributing entangled two-particle states be-
tween either all enumerated pairs of players or nearest
neighbors, as described in Sec. IVC and Sec. IVD, re-
spectively. In these cases, we expect that the mean num-
ber of trials needed to complete the game will scale as
either n(n − 1)/2β or n/β, and are therefore relatively
easier to implement for games with a large number of
players.
For example, in the simplest near-term implementa-
tion, a single game system can be constructed at a central
location, and players can travel to the game and individ-
ually specify the operators to be applied to their qubits.
As the technology evolves, the necessary hardware for
specification of qubit operations can be distributed to
distant players, who then can apply their operators to
photonic qubits transported to them over an optical net-
work. In either case, entangled pairs can be generated
and distributed consecutively until all players have suc-
cessfully registered a choice for each pair in which they
are a member. Although great strides continue to be
made in multi-particle experiments [11, 12], it is clear
that — until β −→ 1 — two-particle games are far more
feasible, and could allow tests of quantum game theory
to be performed in the near future.
Given some single-trial success probability β, the num-
ber of trials is limited by the rate at which two-particle
entangled qubits can be provided. A bright source
3of entangled photon pairs has been constructed using
an argon-ion laser and parametric down-conversion in
BBO crystals, capable of producing 140 detected two-
photon coincidences per second per milliwatt of Ar+
pump power [9]. In principle, given an electrically-driven
source of single photons [14], entangled photon pairs also
could be generated in a compact all-solid-state system
using down-conversion in periodically-poled lithium nio-
bate waveguides [15, 16]. However, in the future it is
possible that up to 109 pairs per second could be pro-
duced using a single quantum dot embedded in a p-i-n
junction surrounded by a microcavity [17].
III. PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMICS
A. Overview
A pure market economy fails to provide efficient levels
of public goods for two key reasons. By definition, a pub-
lic good is non-excludable. Once the good is provided,
there is no means of charging for it or restricting access
to it. This creates the free rider problem in which people
are tempted to use the public good without paying for
it. The prisoner’s dilemma is a perfect illustration of this
free-rider problem. In this two-person game, each player
has the choice to “cooperate” and “defect”. Payoffs for
both players are higher when both of them choose to co-
operate instead of defect. However, each individual is
better off by defecting.
Furthermore, even if there exists a third party (usu-
ally the government) to enforce contribution to the public
goods, individuals have the incentive to hide their pref-
erences on how much they value the public good. This
information asymmetry makes it difficult to determine
the efficiency of public goods distribution.
Some of these issues have been addressed in economics
literature. For example, if the public good can be provi-
sioned through a government, there exist mechanisms to
reveal preferences of individuals [18]. Also, experimen-
tal work on public goods [19] compares people’s actual
behaviors to the predictions of game theory.
The free rider problem, however, is more difficult to
overcome. In the absence of a benevolent dictator, self-
motivation becomes the dominant factor. Luckily, two
phenomena mitigate the effects of free riding. The first
is the folk theorem [20, 21]. If the game is played repeat-
edly within a relatively small group, the folk theorem sug-
gests an efficient outcome may be enforceable through the
strategy of punishing a defector. It is arguable whether
this will work in practice because game theory rationality
places a strong burden on the individuals to determine
the correct strategies. The second phenomenon is indi-
viduals’ motivations may not be completely selfish: ex-
perimental evidence suggests people may be altruistic, at
least in relatively small groups [19]. However, ensuring
an efficient outcome is not possible without the interven-
tion of a third party.
B. Formulating Public Goods Games
For simplicity in discussing the public goods game, we
assume there is only one public good and one private
good which players can use to contribute to producing the
public good. It is easy to generalize to multiple goods.
There are n players indexed by k. We make the fol-
lowing definitions:
x amount of public good
yk initial endowment of private good of player k
ck contribution of player k
Qk(x, y) utility of player k when consuming x units of
public good and y units of private good
g(C) production function of the public good as a function
of total contributions C =
∑
k ck
If contribution is voluntary and continuous, each indi-
vidual would want to choose a contribution to maximize:
max
ck
Qk(g(c), yk − ck) (1)
which leads to
1
dg/dc
=
dQk/dx
dQk/dy
(2)
for all k when evaluated at the maximizing choices with
x = g(c) and y = yk − ck. These give n equations for the
n contribution values {ck}.
This condition says each person will contribute up to
the point where the marginal rate of substitution is equal
to the marginal benefit of his contribution in providing
the public good.
We use the standard economic efficiency measure of
Pareto optimality [22]. That is, there exists no other
allocation such that one player is strictly better off while
all others are at least as well off as before. In our context,
Pareto efficiency requires [22]
1
dg/dc
=
∑
k
dUk/dx
dUk/dy
(3)
Let C be the Pareto efficient level of total contribution
and C′ be the equilibrium level of total contribution. The
above two conditions mean that g′(C) < g′(C′).
For well-behaved g with diminishing rate of return,
C > C′. Thus the equilibrium level of contribution is less
than the efficient level. This analysis assumes the players’
contribution choices are continuous. However, similar
results follow if contributions are restricted to discrete
levels. For less well behaved g, there may be multiple
equilibria as well as contribution levels at the efficient
levels.
4C. An Example
We use a simple example that illustrates the core issue
of the free-rider problem. Assume Qk(x, y) = x + y for
all k and g(c) = aC/n where a is a parameter and C is
the total contribution level. That is, C =
∑
k ck.
It can be shown quite easily that the following charac-
terizes the unique Nash equilibrium:
• If a < 1, C = 0 and this is the Pareto efficient
outcome
• If 1 < a < n, C = 0, but is an inefficient outcome.
One efficient outcome in this case is ck = yk but
this is not an equilibrium since each player increases
payoff by defecting, i.e., switching to ck = 0.
• If n < a, ck = yk is the efficient outcome.
This analysis can be interpreted as follows. The pro-
duction function g multiplies the total contribution by
a. The result is then equally divided back to the play-
ers. If a is less than 1, there is no gain to produce the
public good and so the efficient outcome is not to pro-
duce any. If a is greater than n, then for each unit the
player receives back more than the contribution, thus it
is advantageous to contribute and the equilibrium will be
efficient.
The interesting case, giving a social dilemma, is when a
is between 1 and n. In this case, the public good per per-
son increases with contribution. However, the marginal
benefit of each contribution is still smaller than 1. Thus
a player receives only a/n in benefit for a unit of addi-
tional contribution, which is a net loss. Therefore, it is
rational not to contribute. However, failure to contribute
is an inefficient outcome. Thus we have a social dilemma
in that the group as a whole is better off if all contribute,
but each person prefers not to contribute and hence their
rational choices lead to no public good production. More-
over, this case has multiple Pareto efficient outcomes. For
example, both total contribution and total contribution
from all but one person are efficient outcomes.
D. Heterogeneity and Asymmetric Information
In the case of total contribution, it is also easy to show
that for some set of {yk}, one or more individuals will be
worse off than the case of no contribution.
Thus an efficient outcome may not be desirable for
other reasons, such as voluntary participation constraints
(some players do not want to play the game). To address
this issue, we will focus our attention on a smaller set
of efficient outcomes that also satisfy the voluntary par-
ticipation constraints. Thus, in additional to Pareto effi-
ciency, we also require Qk(g(C), yk − ck) ≥ Qk(g(0), yk)
for all k, i.e., each person will also be better off in this
efficient outcome then the no contribution case. For our
example, this implies
a
n
n∑
j=1
cj ≥ ck (4)
for all k. The following contribution profile is efficient
and satisfies Eq. (4):
ck =
{
yk if yk < C
∗
C∗ if yk ≥ C∗ (5)
where
C∗ =
a
n− an+ am
m∑
j=1
yj (6)
where yk is sorted in ascending order andm is the largest
integer less than n for which C∗ ≥ yk holds for all k =
1 . . .m.
Under this additional constraint, if the distribution of
wealth is narrow (specifically, ay¯ ≥ yk for all k where
y¯ = 1
n
∑
k yk is the mean value of the private goods),
then everyone should contribute everything. If there is
a wider distribution of wealth, then there is a cut-off
point C∗. Everyone should contribute everything if their
wealth yk ≤ C∗ and contribute only up to C∗ if their
wealth is more than C∗. Thus to maintain voluntary
participation the rich should contribute more in absolute
terms than the poor, but less in percentage terms.
If wealth is distributed narrowly, (satisfying Eq. (4) if
individual contributes everything) then there is no need
for asymmetric contribution. Therefore, it is sufficient to
treat the problem as if wealth is equal.
However, if condition Eq. (4) is not satisfied, a new in-
centive issue arises. To be able to solicit the “correct”
amount of contribution from every individual, we not
only need to solve the free-rider problem, but also cor-
rectly identify the wealth level of every individual. Fur-
thermore, individuals have incentives to pretend to be
poorer than they are to minimize their contributions.
The following example illustrates these issues. Con-
sider a population with two levels of wealth: m individ-
uals have initial wealth y and n − m individuals have
wealth αy where α > 1. We are interested in the issue of
whether a mechanism can achieve an equilibrium that is
not only efficient, but also satisfies the voluntary partic-
ipation constraint. The only interesting cases are where
the contribution strategy is asymmetric. That is, not ev-
ery individual has to contribute everything in the desir-
able allocation. One interesting case is where m = n− 1
(with only one high-wealth individual). In this case, it
can be shown that the desirable allocation is everyone
with the lower wealth contributes everything. The per-
son with wealth αy should not contribute everything if
α > a(n−1)(n−a) . He should contribute
ay(n−1)
n−a
.
5IV. A QUANTUM MECHANISM FOR PUBLIC
GOODS PROVISIONING
We first characterize equilibria of the quantum game of
the homogeneous version of the public goods game. This
allows us to study several configurations, such as differ-
ent entanglement and interpretation of the qubits, of the
quantum game. Subsequently, the results in the simple
homogeneous case will be extended to the heterogeneous
case.
For the quantum mechanism, each player can choose
either to contribute nothing (ck = 0, “defect”) or ev-
erything (ck = y, “cooperate”). We can also consider
an intermediate case in which players can select from a
discrete range of contribution values, 0, y/K, 2y/K, . . . , y
for various choices of K, but in our case allowing such in-
termediate contributions gives lower average payoffs for
the strategies we present below.
Here is an example of the intermediate case. For n = 3
players and using 3 bits to specify discrete choices: either
contribute fully (ck = y, “cooperate”) or contribute noth-
ing (ck = 0, “defect”), there are 8 states. Suppose we let
the value 0 correspond to “cooperate”. Then the payoffs
to the three players are (using y = 1)
000 a a a
001 2a/3 2a/3 2a/3 + 1
010 2a/3 2a/3 + 1 2a/3
011 a/3 a/3 + 1 a/3 + 1
100 2a/3 + 1 2a/3 2a/3
101 a/3 + 1 a/3 a/3 + 1
110 a/3 + 1 a/3 + 1 a/3
111 1 1 1
(7)
The quantum version of the game is set up as follows:
first create entangled qubits (with 0 and 1 representing
cooperate and defect, respectively), allow the individuals
to operate on their individual qubit, then combine the
result (by undoing the initial entangling operation). To
preserve the correspondence with the original game, the
entanglement operator should commute with those quan-
tum operations corresponding to the classical choices.
The final measurement gives a definite value for each
qubit, which then corresponds to the individuals’ choices.
In general, players are allowed to apply any operator
to their qubit(s). We consider general single-qubit oper-
ators, given by
U(θ, φ, α) =
(
e−iφ cos θ2 e
iα sin θ2
−e−iα sin θ2 eiφ cos θ2
)
(8)
up to an irrelevant overall phase factor. (A further gener-
alization would allow measurements on the single qubit.
This gives no advantage in at least in some cases [7].)
For n = 2, this reduces to the Prisoner’s dilemma,
which has a nice interpretation in terms of conventional
mechanisms. Entangled states allow player 1 to affect the
final outcome produced by the action of player 2 and vice
versa. In a way, it allows for pre-commitment. Consider
the following argument. Player 1 would love to tell player
2 that if player 2 commits to cooperate, then he would
also cooperate. However, without playing a repeated ver-
sion of the game, the ability to punish the other player
or without a 3rd party to enforce the commitment, both
players will realize immediately they are better off reneg-
ing their commitments. Entanglement allows the parties
to commit without a third party to enforce the commit-
ments.
The expected payoffs can be viewed as functions of the
players’ choices and game definition: Pk(U1, . . . , Un; J, a)
(where we take y = 1 without loss of generality since it
just rescales the payoffs).
A. Equilibria for the Quantum Public Goods Game
In this section, we characterize equilibria for three
schemes of entanglement of the public goods quantum
mechanism. If players are allowed to use any single qubit
operators given by Eq. (8), there is no single pure strat-
egy equilibrium. However, we found mixed strategy equi-
libria, with expected payoffs depending on the degree of
entanglement provided in the initial state. In each case,
we find multiple equilibria. These payoffs are superior to
that produced by the classical game in which all players
defect so no public good is produced.
We assume all individuals are risk-neutral expected
utility maximizers. Player k’s expected payoff function
is given by Pk(ψ) =
∑
s Pk(s)|ψ(s)|2 where Pk(s) is the
payoff for player k given the choices specified by state s.
We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the solution
concept for the quantum game. Each individual will play
a strategy (pure or mixed) such that they are mutually
maximizing their expected payoff. None has the incentive
to make a unilateral change to their strategy.
A single-player operator uˆ forms a symmetric Nash
equilibrium if for any other choice u 6= uˆ
Pk(ψ(uˆ, . . . , uˆ)) ≥ Pk(ψ(uˆ, . . . , uˆ, u, uˆ, . . . , uˆ)) (9)
for all players k, with u substituted for the kth player’s
choice on the right-hand side. For homogeneous prefer-
ences, it is sufficient that this hold for just one player.
More generally, asymmetric equilibria involve possibly
different operations for each player.
Whether such an equilibrium exists, and if so whether
it is unique and gives the optimum payoffs for the players,
depends on the set of allowed operations, the amount and
type of entanglement (specified by the choice of J) and
the nature of the payoffs.
Our analysis includes mixed strategy equilibria since
in many cases, particularly with respect to the quantum
version of the public goods game, there is no pure strat-
egy equilibria. The strategic space for quantum games
are infinite. We limit our attention to finite mixed strate-
gies. That is, we only allow individuals to randomly (with
any probabilities assignment) choose within a finite set of
6operators. We also make the standard assumption that
individuals have access to a perfect randomization pro-
cess.
In the next three subsections, we report three different
schemes of entanglement and their corresponding mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium.
B. Full Entanglement
A conceptually simple approach allows arbitrary en-
tanglement among the players’ qubits. As one exam-
ple, consider fully entangled states. The initial entan-
gled state is (|00...0〉 + i|11...1〉)/√2, using the 2n × 2n
entanglement matrix
Jn =
1√
2
(I + iσx ⊗ . . .⊗ σx) (10)
where the product in the second term consists of n factors
of σx, the 2× 2 Pauli matrix
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Allowing general single-bit operators of Eq. (8), we find
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the players. How-
ever, there are a variety of mixed strategy equilibria. As
one example, let
u(0) ≡ U(0, 0, 0) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
(11)
u(1) ≡ U(0, pi/2, 0) =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
Note u(0) corresponds to the classical “cooperate” op-
tion. A mixed strategy consisting of each player ran-
domly selecting u(0) or u(1), each with probability 1/2,
gives expected payoff of (1+a)/2. This is an equilibrium:
if any one player switches to using a different operator,
or different mixture of operators, the expected payoff for
that player remains equal to (1+ a)/2. While this payoff
is less than the efficient outcome, it is substantially bet-
ter than the classical outcome with payoff of 1 since all
choose to defect.
Although this scheme is not practical with respect to
implementation due to its use of highly entangled states,
we include it as a comparison to other schemes.
C. Two-particle Entanglement
Full entanglement is difficult to implement as n in-
creases, particularly for qubits communicated over long
distances. Thus we consider restricting entanglement to
only pairs of qubits. In this case, we suppose each pair
of players has a maximally entangled pair, so each player
has n− 1 qubits.
The entanglement matrix for a case consisting of N =(
n
2
)
pairs is
Jpair(N) = J2 ⊗ . . .⊗ J2 (12)
1 3
2 5 46
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅❅
FIG. 1: Six qubits giving two-particle entanglement among
three players. The first player operates on bits 1 and 3, which
are entangled with bits 2 and 4, respectively owned by the
second and third players.
with the product consisting of N factors of the entangle-
ment operator of Eq. (10) for the case of n = 2, i.e., full
entanglement among two qubits.
With multiple bits per player, we also need to specify
how the final measured state is to be interpreted. One ap-
proach is to allow various amounts of contribution rather
than all or none. That is, if z of the n− 1 bits for player
k are 0, player k’s contribution is ck = yz/(n− 1), rang-
ing from 0 to y. So instead of two choices, the player
has a range of possible contributions. This choice gives
the same result as the fully entangled case: the mixed
strategies have expected payoff of (1 + a)/2 and remain
weak equilibria.
For example, n = 3 uses six qubits corresponding to
the pairs of players (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3), as shown in
Fig. 1. Thus, for example, the first player operates on
the first and third qubit in this ordering of the bits. The
state |0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1〉 has 0, 0 for the first and third qubit,
so the first player has z = 2 and contributes y. The
second player, using the second and fifth bits, has 0, 1
with z = 1 and contributes y/2.
An alternate interpretation of the bits provides higher
payoffs while maintaining the same mixed strategy equi-
libria. Specifically, we again suppose contributions are
all or nothing but now consider the player to contribute
if any of the n − 1 bits equals 0. This simple change in
the construction of the game gives expected payoff equal
to
a− 2−(n−1)(a− 1) (13)
which, since 1 < a < n, is only slightly less than the high-
est possible payoff, a. As examples, the expected payoffs
for n = 3 and 4 are, respectively, (1+3a)/4 and (1+7a)/8.
As n increases, the expected payoff approaches the opti-
mal value.
We could also consider other interpretations, e.g., full
contribution if a majority of the bits are 0, and otherwise
no contribution.
Significantly, the mixed strategy remains an equilib-
rium even if a player applies different operators to each
of the n− 1 bits.
7D. Two-particle Entanglement with Neighbors
Two-particle entanglement among all possible pairs of
players requires n(n − 1)/2 entangled pairs. While sig-
nificantly easier to implement than entanglement among
n-players, we can also consider behavior with even less
entanglement. Specifically, consider the players in some
arbitrary order and only provide an entangled pair be-
tween successive players in that order (with an additional
pair between the first and last). This entanglement re-
quires only 2n qubits.
This case maintains the same equilibrium mixed strate-
gies. If we interpret the two bits of each player as al-
lowing partial contributions, the expected payoff remains
(1 + a)/2. Using the all-or-none method, where a player
contributes everything if at least one of the two bits
equals 0, the payoff is (1 + 3a)/4 for all n. Note this
is the same as the payoff of the full two-particle case,
Eq. (13), for n = 3 (as expected: for n = 3 the neigh-
bor pairs are the same as a two-particle entanglement
between all pairs of players).
Again, the payoff is superior to the classical game Nash
equilibrium. Unlike entanglement among all pairs, the
payoff does not improve with larger n. Thus this re-
sult illustrates a tradeoff: lower performance when using
fewer pairs.
E. Generalization to Heterogenous Individuals
The issue of heterogenous wealth is largely ignored in
our analysis of the quantum game. If the distribution of
wealth is narrow (as defined in Sec. III D), an efficient
quantum solution that assumes homogeneous wealth will
also satisfy the voluntary participation constraints mak-
ing heterogeneity a non-issue.
Furthermore, if the issue of adverse selection (incentive
to hide information) is addressed by some other method,
then the quantum mechanism can be used in tandem to
address the general case. Specifically, in the case of het-
erogenous wealth, if every individual’s wealth is revealed
to the mechanism, then the mechanism can be modified
slightly by the following method to yield the desirable
outcome. First calculate the optimal contribution for ev-
ery individual based on the revealed wealth levels as de-
scribed in Sec. III D. Then the players play the quantum
game with the knowledge that the final qubits are inter-
preted as follows: an individual contributes the optimal
amount, not his total wealth, if one or more of his qubits
are zero. Essentially, all the contribution levels are pre-
determined and the issues reduce to just the free-rider
problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Quantum mechanics can be used to develop new for-
mulation of classical economics games which give arise to
new solutions. In this paper, we have shown how a quan-
tum mechanism can be constructed to solve the free-rider
problem in the public goods game, without the need of
third party enforcement nor repeated play. Implementa-
tion issues are also explored and addressed.
Most of the power of this new mechanism comes from
entangled states, which in theory allow individuals to
co-ordinate and commit in environments when classical
means do not. Incidentally, entanglement is also the ma-
jor issue determining whether a quantum mechanism is
practical or not.
Three different schemes of entanglement are explored.
We found that two-particle entanglement, which is feasi-
ble for the near future, can also solve the free-rider prob-
lem and achieve nearly efficient outcomes. Furthermore,
we have also argued that the mechanism is robust with
respect to limited amount of heterogeneity in the system
if there is no adverse selection.
Game theoretic solutions (such as the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium we discuss in this paper) are at best approxi-
mations of real human behavior. In this case, rationality
dictates that each individual has a full understanding of
the quantum mechanical implications of his choices. How
well this describes the actual behavior of people involved
in quantum games is an interesting direction for future
work with laborabory experiments involving human sub-
jects.
There are many natural extensions of this research.
First, people may use criteria other than expected pay-
off, e.g., to minimize variance in payoff if they are risk
adverse. Second, the case of heterogeneous players and
adverse selection requires further analysis. This work
also suggests experimental research, exploring the issues
of practicality of implementation and human behavior
with respect to manipulating quantum states.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF MIXED
STRATEGY PAYOFF
This appendix derives Eq. (13) and shows the mixed
strategy is indeed an equilibrium: no single player can
benefit from deviating from the mixture. A similar
derivation applies to the other cases with different entan-
glement (i.e., full or two-particle only among neighbors)
and interpreting multiple bits per player as indicating
partial contributions. For simplicity, we take the private
good value to be y = 1.
Consider the behavior of player 1, selecting operators
u(2), . . . , u(n) while all other players select either u(0) or
u(1) of Eq. (11) with equal probability for all their bits.
8The initial state Jpair(N)(1, 0, . . . , 0) is
⊗ 1√
2
(1, 0, 0, i)
with one factor for each pair. Subsequent operations on
each pair are independent. Consider the pair between
players j, k. If these players use operators A and B re-
spectively, the final state for their pair is
ψpair(A,B) = J
†
2(A⊗B)
1√
2
(1, 0, 0, i) (A1)
Players other than the first use either u(0) or u(1).
Evaluating the products in Eq. (A1) for these cases gives
ψpair(u(0), u(0)) = (1, 0, 0, 0) (A2)
ψpair(u(0), u(1)) = (0, 0, 0, 1)
ψpair(u(1), u(0)) = (0, 0, 0, 1)
ψpair(u(1), u(1)) = (−1, 0, 0, 0)
so players making the same choice produce a pair equal to
±|00〉 (i.e., both cooperate), while those making opposite
choices give |11〉 (i.e., both defect).
For a given instance of this mixed strategy, let tk ∈
{0, 1} indicate the operator choice of player k = 2, . . . , n:
u(tk). Then the final state for the pair involving players
j and k is just ψpair(u(tj), u(tk)). Thus the portion of the
final state corresponding to pairs not involving player 1
is
ψother =
⊗
j,k
ψpair(u(tj), u(tk))
with the tensor product over all pairs 2 ≤ j < k ≤ n.
The nonzero components of this vector are all ±1, which
have unit magnitude so do not affect the probabilities of
the final measurement.
The pair involving players 1 and k gives v(k)(tk) =
ψpair(u
(k), u(tk)). For any choice of operator u
(k), evalu-
ating Eq. (A1) using Eq. (11) gives
v
(k)
0,0 (1) = −v(k)1,1 (0) (A3)
v
(k)
0,1 (1) = v
(k)
1,0 (0)
v
(k)
1,0 (1) = −v(k)0,1 (0)
v
(k)
1,1 (1) = v
(k)
0,0 (0)
so, apart from some sign changes, player k switching from
u(0) to u(1) simply reverses the result of the two-particle
interaction between players 1 and k.
The overall final state is the tensor product of these
results for the individual pairs. The nonzero components
of this state vector are specified by the values for the bits
involving player 1. That is, the final state has the form
n⊗
k=2
(∑
xk,yk
v(k)xk,yk(tk)|xk, yk〉
)
⊗ ψother
with the xk, yk each summed over 0 and 1.
Measuring this final state produces a state with defi-
nite values for the xk, yk, with probability Pr(x, y, t) =∏n
k=2 |v(k)xk,yk(tk)|2. For this state, we determine the pay-
off to player 1 as follows.
First, the all-or-none interpretation of the bits means
player 1 contributes 1 if any of the xk = 0. Defining the
indicator function χ(p) to equal 1 when the proposition
p is true and 0 otherwise, we can write this contribution
as 1−∏k χ(xk = 1).
The contribution for player k > 1 is 1 if it has a 0 bit in
its pair with player 1 (i.e., yk = 0) or at least one player
(other than players 1 or k) makes the same choice of
operator as player k (since then Eq. (A2) shows that pair
of players will have value |0, 0〉 so, in particular, player k
will have at least one of its bits equal to zero). Let nb be
the number of players 2, . . . , n that select operator u(b),
for b = 0, 1. Note nb is the number of values in t2, . . . , tn
equal to b, and n0+n1 = n−1. With these definitions, the
contribution of player k is χ(yk = 0∧ntk = 1)+χ(ntk >
1).
Combining the contributions from all players, the pay-
off P1(x, y, t) to player 1 for this measured state, is then
of the form a
n
(1 +A) + (1− a
n
)B with
A =
∑
k
(χ(yk = 0 ∧ ntk = 1) + χ(ntk > 1))
B =
∏
k
χ(xk = 1)
In this expression,
∑
k χ(ntk > 1) can be written as∑1
t=0 χ(nt > 1)
∑
k χ(tk = t) =
∑
t ntχ(nt > 1).
The expected payoff for player 1 for the given choices
of the other players (as specified by the tk values) is∑
x,y Pr(x, y, t)P1(x, y, t).
Finally, the mixed strategy used by the other players
means each of the 2n−1 choices for the values of the tk
is equally likely, and must be summed over to get the
expected payoff of player 1 when the others use the mixed
strategy: 〈P1〉 = 2−(n−1)
∑
x,y,t Pr(x, y, t)P1(x, y, t).
In the sum over x, y, only the factor |v(k)xk,yk(tk)|2 in
Pr(x, y, t) depends on xk, yk. Thus for terms involving
player k, the remaining factors in Pr(x, y, t) sum to 1
since the v(k)(tk) are normalized vectors.
Thus 〈P1〉 is a sum of three terms. The first is
2−(n−1)
a
n
∑
t
(1 + n0χ(n0 > 1) + n1χ(n1 > 1))
or
a
n
(1 + (n− 1)(1− 22−n))
The second term is
2−(n−1)
a
n
∑
k,t,xk,yk
|v(k)xk,yk(tk)|2χ(yk = 0 ∧ ntk = 1)
For ntk = 1, the only terms contributing to the sum over
t are those for which tj 6= tk, for all j 6= k, i.e., there are
9just two cases: tk = 0 and the rest are 1, and vice versa.
So this term becomes
2−(n−1)
a
n
∑
k
1∑
t=0
∑
xk
|v(k)xk,0(t)|2
The inner two sums give |v(k)0,0 (0)|2 + |v(k)1,0 (0)|2 +
|v(k)0,0 (1)|2 + |v(k)1,0 (1)|2 which, from Eq. (A3), equals∑
x,y |v(k)x,y(0)|2 = 1 since the v(k) vectors are normalized.
Thus this term is 2−(n−1) a
n
(n− 1).
Similarly, Eq. (A3) gives the third term equal to
2−(n−1)
(
1− a
n
)
.
Combining these results, 〈P1〉 is a − 2−(n−1)(a − 1).
This result is independent of the operators selected by
player 1, i.e., the values of the v(k).
Other choices for the mixed strategy operators
u(0), u(1) are possible as well. They need only satisfy
Eq. (A2) (up to an overall phase factor) and also compen-
sate for any choices made by the first player via Eq. (A3),
again up to overall phase factors.
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